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This paper considers the problem of a fashion trend-setter confronting
an imitator who can produce the same product at lower cost. A one-
dimensional product space is considered, which is an abstraction of the
key attribute of some consumer good.
Three broad strategies can be optimal for the fashion-leader: (1) Never
innovate; milk prots from the initially advantageous position but ulti-
mately concede the market without a ght. (2) Innovate once but only
once, which just temporarily defers conceding the market. (3) Cycle in-
nitely around product space, never letting the imitator catch up and
capture the market. Sometimes the cycles start immediately; sometimes
the innovator should wait for a time before beginning the cycles.
The optimal solution exhibits strong state-dependency, with so-called
Skiba curves separating regions in state space where various of these
strategies are optimal. There are even instances of intersecting Skiba
curves. In most cases, analytical expressions can be stated that charac-
terize these Skiba curves.
1 Introduction
This paper considers the problem of a fashion trend-setter that has to deal
with an imitator who can produce the same product at a lower cost. A one-
dimensional product space is considered, which is an abstraction of the key
attribute of some consumer good. An obvious example is the width of neckties,
which we all have observed to vary over time. Other examples might include
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the extent to which accessories are ashy or understated, the width of labels on
sport coats, or the length of skirts. The trend-setter denes what is fashionable,
and o¤-label brands imitate them.
This paper suggests a novel explanation for the existence of fashion cycles,
namely movement around a product space that is strategic on the part of
the fashion-setter and imitative on the part of low-cost competitors. In reality
the product design space is of very high dimension, leaving lots of room for
complex trajectories that never settle down to a single steady state. We will
show, however, that such complexity is not essential to this story. Even in
a one-dimensional abstraction of that space, the optimal solution may involve
continual adaptation and imitation. Furthermore, a side benet of sticking
with a one-dimensional product space is that we can write explicit expressions
describing the thresholds between initial conditions where di¤erent strategies
are optimal.
It turns out that the structure of the optimal solution depends on how much
it costs to develop new designs and on the initial positions of both rms in the
product space . For low design costs it is optimal for the rms to cycle around
the product space indenitely, with a Skiba curve separating the two possible
directions for changing the design initially.
For intermediate values of the cost, two other Skiba curves circumscribe an
area in the middle of the product space where it is optimal for the fashion setter
not to innovate, at least initially. In that case either the imitator simply catches
up and conquers the whole market or the fashion setter changes its design later.
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If the investment cost of making new designs is still larger, two other Skiba
curves arise, which separate a policy of never changing the design from a
policy where the market leader makes an initial major design change but no
subsequent changes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some relevant literature.
The model is presented in Section 3. A short overview of the solution structure
is provided in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the solution structure when the costs
of making new designs are so low that periodically changing designs forever is
optimal. In Section 6 these costs are large enough that it is not optimal to change
the design more than once . Section 7 considers parameter constellations where,
depending on the initial situation, either periodic design changes or making no
new designs at all can be optimal.
2 Literature Review
Firms engage in at least two kinds of product design innovation: technological
innovation and stylistic or fashion innovation (Schweizer, 2003). The former
improves the product. E.g., computers today are faster than they were ten
years ago. Fashion innovation di¤erentiates whats new from current models
without improving functionality. For womens clothes, red may be in this
year and blue may be out, but that does not mean red is intrinsically better
than blue. Certainly the color red is not a new invention per se. Furthermore,
it is likely that in a few years blue will be in and red will be out, and a few years
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after that, red will be in again. The same happens for the width of mens ties,
the length of skirts, and the popularity of one material relative to another.
In short, we observe that consumers are willing to pay more for one good
(the ingood) than another, functionally equivalent product (the one that is
out). Economists have long been fascinated by this counter-intuitive behavior,
dubbed Veblen e¤ectsin honor of Thornstein Veblens seminal inquiries into
conspicuous consumption (Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996). Typical explanations
involve status or prestige goods conferring utility on their consumers by
allowing implicit association with other high-status consumers of that good. If
a good is so expensive that only the rich can a¤ord it, then onlookers can infer
that anyone they see consuming it must be rich. Allowing others to make that
inference may bring various benets to the conspicuous consumer. A variety of
economic models have been developed under which it is optimal for consumers to
behave in this way (e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Coelho and McClure, 1993;
Bagwell & Bernheim, 1996; Frijters, 1998; Corneo and Jeanne, 1999; Bianchi,
2002).
Here we take this consumer behavior as given, rather than trying to ex-
plain it within a rational actor framework, and instead ask how rms might
manage fashion innovation in order to exploit this behavior in order to maximize
prots. There is already a large management science/operations research liter-
ature providing practical guidance to fashion goods producers, but it does not
treat the rate of fashion innovation as the decision variable of interest. Rather,
these papers address manufacturing (Degraeve and Vandebroek, 1998; Jain and
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Paul, 2001), supply chain management (Donohue, 2000; Mantrala & Rao, 2001;
Milner & Kouvelis, 2002), inventory policy (Fisher et al., 2001 ), pricing (Zhao
and Zheng, 2000 ), and other management issues that arise in the context of a
given fashion innovations product life cycle.
Likewise there is a literature advising rms how quickly to make techno-
logical innovations that improve product functionality (e.g., Paulson Gjerde et
al., 2002), but little has been written about how to manage the rate of fashion
innovation.
A partial exception is Swanns (2001) case study of the evolution of two
prestige cars, the Rolls Royce and the Ferrari. However, that is more of an
interesting descriptive analysis of a particular case than an e¤ort to derive pre-
scriptive insights from a general model.
The closest analog in the literature to the current investigation is Pesendor-
fers (1995) innovative paper. As in our model, Pesendorfers fashion producer
dynamically optimizes the timing of fashion innovations and, nds, as do we,
that the optimal solution could involve introduction of new fashions at xed,
regular intervals whose period varies inversely with the cost of innovation. There
are three signicant di¤erences, however. First, Pesendorfer explicitly models
the behavior of two discrete types of individuals and the producers decision
about how to vary the price of a given fashion over time. In that sense, Pe-
sendorfers focus is on creating a rational-actor model of fashion that includes
the incentives of producers not just consumers, whereas, again, we just take
consumers taste for fashion (meaning products di¤erentiated from low-cost al-
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ternatives) as a given.
Second, Pesendorfer thinks of innovations as discrete. At some xed unit
cost, the innovator can create a new design that is completely di¤erentiated
from the current design, and renders the current design instantly and com-
pletely obsolete. However, it seems more realistic to think of a product design
space. Innovation implies moving ones product within that space, and one could
move a little (minor innovation) or a long way (major innovation). One or the
other might turn out to be optimal, depending on the particular circumstances,
but the model should recognize that the producer has that choice, rather than
assuming arbitrarily that all innovation must necessarily be draconian.
We address only a single-dimensional product space, which is clearly an ab-
straction. Even a simple item of clothing has multiple attributes (color, fabric,
length, texture, etc.). Still, we view allowing even a one-dimensional continuum
to be an advance. Related to this, we view the cost of innovation as increasing
in the amount of innovation. Consider test marketing, for example. Under-
standing how consumers will react to modest variations might be relatively easy,
but accurately predicting the response to a radical change might require more
market research. Likewise, it might take more advertising to persuade people
that what initially seems like a very extreme departure from current trends will
in fact become de rigeur. Indeed, Barnett and Freeman (2001) found, albeit
in the context of technological not fashion innovation, that rm mortality rates
increase with the simultaneous introduction of multiple signicant innovations.
The third and most important di¤erence between our model and Pesendor-
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fers pertains to the existence and behavior of other producers. Pesendorfer
considers the e¤ects of competition, but focuses on a monopolistic producer.
Furthermore, even in the competition case, Pesendorfer (1995, 773) did not al-
low imitation of successful designs. Imitation would give designers an additional
incentive to create new fashions periodically. Clearly imitation is an important
force behind the creation of new designs. However, through the creation of brand
names, designers can at least partially insulate themselves from competition with
potential imitators. In this paper I consider the case in which the designer has
well-dened property rights over his innovations.
Pesendorfers no-imitation case is no doubt of interest, but so is allowing
imitation because knocking o¤expensive designers is pervasive and because
protecting intellectual property rights concerning fashion goods can be di¢ cult,
at least in the US. (Some European countries may have stronger protections.)
Fashion innovations are, by the denitions used here, ineligible for patent pro-
tection because they are not a new invention that advances beyond the prior
art in a non-obvious way. Something like reintroducing the color mauve in
2003, when it was popular in the 1980s but fell out of favor in the 1990s clearly
does not meet that test. Likewise copyright protection cannot be a¤orded in
the US to useful articles, so it can only protect design elements that can
be identied separately from and can exist independently of the utilitarian as-
pects of the article. Practically, that means that fashion designs in apparel
(as opposed to accessories) are hard to copyright. Finally, although defending
a fashion trademark against counterfeiting is relatively straightforward in the
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courts, defending trade dress against imitation is more di¢ cult. (The Lanham
Act di¤erentiates between trademarks, which are words, emblems, logos, or
symbols used to identify goods and distinguish them from those sold by others
and trade dress, which refers to the products overall image or appearance
including shape, size, color, packaging, and marketing.)
To give a concrete example, Abercrombie & Fitch sued American Eagle Out-
tters in 1998 for intentional and systematic copying of its brand, images and
business practices, including its merchandise, marketing and catalog(Seiling,
1998). However, both the lower court and the Pennsylvania Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals sided with American Eagle Outtters because the clothing designs
for which Abercrombie & Fitch sought protection were functional as a matter
of law and therefore not protectable under trade dress (Catalog Age, 2002).
Abercrombie & Fitch then recently led suit seeking just to prevent American
Eagle Outtters from using the number 22on its clothing, arguing that it had
a common law trademark on that number (Associated Press, 2003). That suit
has yet to be resolved, but even if Abercrombie & Fitch wins, it would only
a¤ect a minor aspect of American Eagle Outttersalleged imitation.
In our model we assume there is a single innovative fashion czar that
denes what is fashionable within the product space. This is an outcome Pe-
sendorfer found to be among the plausible competitive equilibria. Essentially
if all consumers believe that only the fashion czar is capable of creating fash-
ion, then this will be the equilibrium outcome. The fashion czars product is
imitated by low-cost producers who are not strategic about their fashion inno-
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vation. That is, the fashion czar might invest in costly activities that support
innovation such as cool hunting (gathering intelligence about trend-setting
consumerspreferences, see, e.g., Gladwell, 1997), depth testmarketing pre-
liminary designs with bellwether groups (e.g., Fisher and Rajaram, 2000), or
advertising heavily to mold expectations about what will be in (Pastine &
Pastine, 2002). The imitators, in contrast, follow the simpler, low-cost strategy
of continually adapting their designs to conform to those of the fashion czar,
whatever those designs are.
Note two di¤erences with some articles in the literature. First, some models
of fashion cycles are based on innovation and imitation by consumers who are
conformists or non-conformists with regard to purchasing decisions (e.g., Mat-
suyama, 1992). Here it is producers who innovate or imitate. Second, portions
of the fashion cycle literature assume that unit production costs are identical
for inand outproducts since they are functionally identical; in our model
it is allowable and perhaps even more reasonable to think of the fashion czar as
having higher production costs.
Thus we imagine a market populated by heterogeneous rms. One rm
optimizes, at some nontrivial information processing cost; others follow heuristic
strategies that are cheaper to implement. This structure is akin to that of
Conlisk (1980) and Sethi & Franke (1995), but our model is continuous time
and the producersdecisions pertain to product design, specically where they
position their products in some product space.
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3 The Model
In the model X represents the decision makers position in some consumer
product space, and Y represents the position of a competitor in that same
space. The notion of a product space here is a one-dimensional abstraction of
the key attribute of some consumer good. E.g., it could be width of neckties.
The design house (e.g. Polo Ralph Lauren or Boss) denes what is fashionable
with high mark-up ties. O¤-label brands imitate them. The design (tie width)
is constantly changing as the high mark-up labels seek to distinguish themselves
from the low cost providers.
The imitators corporate strategy is simply to imitate the market leader
(X), so Y always chases X. Pesendorfer (1995) suggests that one can think
of Y not just as a single follower, but rather as a group of followers, which
motivates the absence of strategic behavior on their part. Not only do they lack
market research capability and other prerequisites to strategic behavior, but
they may also each be relatively small, making it hard to amortize xed costs
of such strategic infrastructure. For this reason our problem is formulated as
an optimal control problem, not a dynamic game.
Thus the system dynamics for this model would be simply:
_X = u; (1)
_Y = X   Y; (2)
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where u is the control variable.
The product space is constrained by zero and one (neckties of innite width
make no sense); so that
0  X  1: (3)
Since Y just follows X, expression (3) implies that Y is also e¤ectively con-
strained to be between zero and one without needing to make this explicit.
The fashion leaders objective function balances the cost of fashion innova-
tion against the benets of sales, where sales are highest if the fashion-leaders
product is well-di¤erentiated in product space from the low-cost imitators prod-
uct. For simplicity we assume that prots grow as the square of the distance
between the innovators and imitators products. Note sales and prots in this
model do not depend on the absolute location of either rm in product space
since fashion is not useful per se, except to di¤erentiate (Pesendorfer, 1995). Ex-
tensions in which consumers care not only about di¤erentiation but also about
the absolute position in product space could be an interesting topic for further
research. The greater the rate of innovation, the more costly that innovation is.
In particular, it is assumed here that the cost of innovation is linear in the rate








(Y  X)2   c juj

dt: (4)
and the decision maker seeks to optimize expression (4), subject to the system
dynamics (1)-(2) and the state constraint (3).
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As an alternative to expression (2) we could have chosen the formulation
_Y = k (X   Y ) ;
with k > 0 measuring the speed of convergence. However, by an appropriate
time transformation it can be shown that increasing k has the same e¤ect as
jointly increasing the switching cost c and decreasing the discount rate r: Hence,
nothing is lost by normalizing k equal to 1; which has the advantage that the
number of parameters in the model is reduced.
4 Properties of Optimal Solutions
Before beginning detailed analysis, it is useful to make some observations about
the nature of optimal solutions to this problem. Most are self-evident or require
only a brief explanation, but collectively they help delineate the space within
which one must search for optimal solutions.
Proposition 1 If it is optimal to exercise control, it is optimal to jump all the
way to a boundary (X = 0 or X = 1).
This follows from the observation that the cost of moving is linear in the
distance moved, but the benet is convex. An immediate implication is that
once the fashion leader has reached a boundary, the leader will subsequently
always be at one boundary or the other.
Proposition 2 Once the fashion leader has reached a boundary, and hence
13
will always be at a boundary, then by symmetry the problem becomes a one-
dimensional dynamic program whose state is the distance D the imitator is
away from that boundary, with value function V which satises
V (D) = maxfD2dt+ e rdtV (De dt); c+ e rdtV (1 D)g
Proposition 3 Assume the fashion leader is at a boundary (X = 0 or 1). Let
D0 be some distance such that when the imitator is that distance away, the
fashion setter prefers jumping to the opposite boundary over staying in place.
Then for all D < D0, the fashion setter would also rather jump to the opposite
boundary than stay in place.
Proof. This is because the cost of moving is the same while the revenue is higher
when D < D0; i.e., V (D; jump) > V (D0; jump): On the other hand, clearly,
V (D; stay) < V (D0; stay), while by denition V (D0; stay) < V (D0; jump):
Corollary 4 If it is ever optimal to jump away from a boundary, it is optimal
to continue to jump forever.
This follows from Proposition 3 because all jumps leave the fashion leader at
the boundary, and eventually the shadow approaches that boundary arbitrarily
close.
Corollary 5 If it is optimal to jump more than once, it is optimal to jump
forever.
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This follows from Proposition 1 (all jumps, including the rst, are to a
boundary) and Corollary 4.
Corollary 6 When the fashion leader is at a boundary, the optimal strategy is
fully characterized by a single distance parameter D0. If the imitators distance
from the boundary D  D0, then the fashion leader should jump immediately.
Otherwise, the fashion leader should wait until D decreases to D0 and then jump.
Corollary 7 Only seven strategies are candidates for optimality:
1) Never moving
2) Jumping once to X = 0
3) Jumping once to X = 1
4) Jumping forever, with the rst jump to X = 0
5) Jumping forever, with the rst jump to X = 1
6) Waiting for some time and then jumping forever, with the rst jump to X = 0
7) Waiting for some time and then jumping forever, with the rst jump to X = 1:
In the next sections we show that all these seven strategies actually occur
for some parameter values.
Proposition 8 Strategy pair #2/#3 and quadruple #4/#5/#6/#7 are incom-
patible in the following sense. For any given set of parameters, if there exist
initial conditions such that any of strategies #4, #5, #6 or #7 is optimal, then
there do not exist initial conditions such that strategies #2 or #3 are optimal.
To see this, note that if either Strategy #4, #5, #6 or #7 are optimal for
some set of initial conditions, then there must exist aD0 such that V (D0; jump) >
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V (D0; stay). Since if the fashion leader were to jump only once, eventually D
would become less than D0, making it no longer optimal to stay.
As will be illustrated below, all other combinations of strategies can co-exist.
That is, for all other combinations of strategies, there exist parameter values
such that any one of those strategies can be optimal depending on the initial
conditions. What is striking is that analytic expression can be written fully
characterizing most of the boundaries (so-called DNS thresholds) separating the
regions where each of the alternative strategies is optimal. These boundaries are
found by equating the value functions computed under each candidate optimal
strategy. It is to the computation of those value functions that the discussion
turns next.
5 Solution structure for low unit cost
To begin the analysis suppose that the market leaders product is initially at
one of the boundaries of product space and, without losing generality, suppose
it is at the lower end, X = 0; and Y < 1=2: (If initially X = 0 and Y > 1=2
then any innovation would be both costly and revenue-reducing, so clearly the
fashion-setter should do nothing at least until Y < 1=2.) If the cost of making
new designs is low, then when the imitator gets close enough to 0, the decision
makers position in the product space will move from zero to one. Later, when
the imitator comes su¢ ciently close to one, the trend-setter will jump from one
back to zero as fast as possible. Since the control variable appears linearly in
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the optimization problem and is unbounded, these movements take the form
of discrete jumps. In this way the solution structure depicted in Figure 1 is
obtained.
This section contains two subsections. In the rst subsection the properties
of the cycle in Figure 1 are investigated. By doing this we obtain an upper bound
on the unit cost for which this solution structure is in fact optimal. The aim of
the second subsection is to nd all points (X;Y ) at which the decision maker
is indi¤erent between jumping to zero and jumping to one: It turns out that all
these points are situated on a curve, which in the optimal control literature is
called a Skiba-curve. This literature was initiated by Skiba (1978), who in a
one state optimal control model detected a threshold (the Skiba point) at which
the decision maker is indi¤erent between either converging to a positive steady
state or converging to zero. Haunschmied et al. (2003) extended this analysis
to a two state optimal control model so, as in the present paper, due to the
extra dimension, the Skiba point becomes a Skiba curve.
5.1 Properties of the Cycle
On the cycle it holds that either X = 1 or X = 0 (see Figure 1): Let Y0 be the
position of the imitator in the product space at which the decision maker is in-
di¤erent between staying at zero or jumping from zero to one, and, analogously,
Y1 is the imitators position for which the market leader is indi¤erent between
staying at one or jumping from one to zero. Dening T1 to be the length of
the time interval at which X = 1; and T0 is the time interval length at which
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X = 0; it can be obtained from expression (2) that
X = 1; Y = 1  (1  Y0)e t for 0 < t < T1;
X = 0; Y = Y1e
T1 t for T1 < t < T1 + T0:
Only the relative positions in the product space matter, which implies that
T1 = T0 = T;
Y1 = 1  Y0:
Since Y has the same value at the end of the interval where X = 1; and at






Next, we determine Y0 by choosing that value of Y0 that maximizes the
objective. Due to the one-to-one correspondence implied by (5), this also gives
the cycle length 2T: . Evaluating the objective on the initial interval [0; T ]









dt  e rT c = (1  Y0)2
1  e T (r+2)













Figure 1: The optimal periodic solution structure.
For reasons of symmetry, excluding discounting, the objective has the same
value on the second interval [T; 2T ] (starting with Y (T ) = 1 Y0 andX (T ) = 0)
as on the rst interval, and this also holds for all consecutive intervals of time













2 (r + 2)
(1  Y0)r+2   Y r+20




(1  Y0)r   Y r0
c (6)
The rst order condition eventually leads to
c =
1














This equation implicitly determines Y0 as a function of the parameters r and
c, which is depicted in Figure 2. From this gure it can be concluded that the
market leader will not change the design very often (Y0 is low) if the cost of
changing the design, c, is large. The same holds for the relation between Y0 and
the discount rate, because a large discount rate implies that the decision maker
is more inuenced by the immediate costs of design change. Furthermore, the
gure shows that for large discount rates, Y0 depends heavily on the rate, while
for smaller discount rates Y0 is insensitive to changes in the discount rate. In
fact, in this gure the curve for r = 0:001 could not be distinguished from that














Figure 2: Optimal Switching Threshold Y0 as a function of c and r.
Clearly it holds that Y0  1=2 for all c > 0: For very small values of c the
following result is established.
Proposition 9 i) When changing the design is costless, i.e. c = 0; the threshold
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Y0 equals 1=2:




Y0 (c) = 0:5 for r  0:5;
lim
c!0
Y0 (c) < 0:5 for r > 0:5:
Proof. From (7) it can be obtained that Y0 = 1=2 for c = 0: Furthermore,













: Thus, if r > 0:5 the c-curve in
Figure 2 lies below the Y0-axis for values of Y0 less than but close to 1=2: Since
c = 1=2 (r + 2) > 0 for Y0 = 0; this proves that limc!0 Y0 (c) < 0:5 for r > 0:5:
Result i) is intuitively plausible since  if changing the design is costless 
the market leaders strategy is simply always to maximize the distance between
X and Y; which leads to chattering around 1=2. It is clear that Y0 = 0:5 implies
that the cycle length equals zero. Hence, the proposition implies that
lim
c!0
T (c) = 0 for r  0:5;
lim
c!0
T (c) > 0 for r > 0:5:
Result ii) is illustrated in Figure 2 for r = 0:7; where limc!0 Y0 (c) = 0:053:














Figure 3: Optimal Interval Length T .
even when the cost of design change is almost zero. For the sake of illustration,
optimal interval lengths T for various parameter values are depicted in Figure
3.
The following result provides an upper bound on the cost of changing the
design above which it is not optimal to have a solution structure as depicted in
Figure 1.
Proposition 10 Exactly for
c >
1
2 (r + 2)
(8)
Y0 does not exist and for c = 12(r+2) it holds that Y0 = 0:
Proof. By letting Y0 ! 0 in (7), we obtain that c = 12(r+2) : From this same
expression it can be derived that a non-negative value for Y0 does not exist for
c > 12(r+2) :
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For c  12(r+2) the cost of changing the design is so expensive that the
same design is kept forever when the decision maker nds itself at one of the
boundaries of the product space (X = 0 or X = 1): One simply stays there
while the imitators product becomes more and more similar. This implies that
the decision makers revenue decreases over time.
In the example with r = 0:7, r = 0:5, r = 0:1; and r = 0:01; the maximum
value of c for which periodic design change is optimal is c = 0:1852; c = 0:2;
c = 0:2381, and c = 0:2488; respectively: If the discount rate is large the decision
maker is reluctant to incur immediate costs. Therefore, the upper bound on c
above which a solution with frequent design change does not occur, goes down
as r increases.
Note that Proposition 10 does not imply that designs will not be changed at
all for c > 12(r+2) : If initially the market leaders product is in the interior of the
product space (0 < X < 1); an initial design change such that X jumps to one
of the boundaries and then stays there may still be optimal. This possibility
will be explored in Section 6.
5.2 Skiba Curve
The aim of this subsection is to nd a curve in the (X;Y ) plane on which the
fashion trendsetter is indi¤erent between choosing the design X = 0 or X = 1:
By denition the outside points of this curve are (0; Y0) and (1; 1  Y0) : It is
also clear that (1=2; 1=2) must be part of the Skiba curve.






; with Y0 < Y < 1  Y0: Then we evaluate the objective values for





; for which both values are equal, belong to the Skiba curve.
First we consider an immediate upward jump from X to 1: On the initial time
interval, say 0 < t < t, Y increases from Y to 1  Y0: Then, from that moment
on the solution structure depicted in Figure 1 applies, the objective value of
















































Analogously, we consider an immediate downward jump from X to 0 and




















To obtain the Skiba curve, we equate the objective values of jumping upwards
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and downward. In the appendix it is obtained that this gives:
X =   1






























(1  Y0)r   Y r0

(1  Y0)r+2   Y r+20







This is the Skiba curve, although we note that there is no explicit expression
for Y0: Instead, it is implicitly given by (7). For the parameter values
r = 0:1 and c = 0:1; (12)
the Skiba curve is depicted in Figure 4.










Figure 4: Skiba curve for r = 0:1 and c = 0:1:
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6 Solution structure for large unit cost
From Proposition 10 the cyclical solution structure of Figure 1 cannot be optimal
when the cost of changing the design is large, i.e. when c > 12(r+2) . This implies
that then it can never be optimal to change the design in such a way that X
jumps from a level lower than Y to a level that is higher than Y; or vice versa.
After excluding such design changes, three candidate policies are left, namely:
 starting from a situation where X > Y ; jump up to X = 1 but make no
subsequent design changes in the future. The value of the objective that
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:
 starting from a situation where X < Y , jump down to X = 0 but make no

























The fashion trend-setter is indi¤erent between making only an initial design




















This is an upward sloping line, which lies below the 450 line, because the
policy with the initial upward jump can only occur if X > Y . The Skiba curve
only occurs in the relevant region if X < 1 for Y = 0; which leads to the





Being indi¤erent between an initial downward jump or refraining from any













X + c (r + 2) :
This is an upward sloping line above the 450 line. This curve is only relevant
if Y < 1 for X = 0; which again gives c < 1r+2 .
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (a) Consider the c-region 12(r+2) < c <
1
r+2 : Then the optimal
policy is
 X < 2 Y  2c (r + 2) : make an initial design change equivalent to a down-
ward jump to X = 0 in the one dimensional product space. Then refrain
from doing any changes afterwards.
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Figure 5: Skiba curves for r = 0:1 and c = 0:3.
 2 Y   2c (r + 2) < X < 2 Y + 2c (r + 2)  1 : make no design changes.
 X > 2 Y + 2c (r + 2)  1 : make an initial design change equivalent to an
upward jump to X = 1. Afterwards make no design changes.
(b) Consider the c-region c > 1r+2 : Then the optimal policy is to make no
design changes at all.
The next gure illustrates case (a). After choosing r = 0:1 we must have
0:2381 < c < 0:4762 to be in the relevant parameter region. The gure is drawn
for c = 0:3:
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7 Intermediate c
In the hairline case where c = 12(r+2) ; it holds that Y0 = 0; and the Skiba curve
(11), that separates the two policies of initially jumping up or down followed by
periodic design changes as depicted in Figure 1, becomes X = Y : This hairline
case is presented in Figure 6.









Figure 6: Hairline case c = 12(r+2) for r = 0:1:
It should be noted that the Skiba curve X = Y ; denoted by (11), is not
really relevant since here the unit cost is too large for periodic design changes to
be optimal. Instead, it is better to refrain from doing any design changes when
X = Y:
This raises the question whether for values of the unit cost c a little bit
below 12(r+2) (implying that Y0 is close to zero) making no changes at all could
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be better than jumping to the cycle for some initial values of X and Y . After
all, in Section 3 we only compared the objective values resulting from periodic
design changes after initial upward and downward jumps, without checking their
absolute values. In case these objective values are negative, then a policy of
making no design changes at all would be preferable.
The point where it is least attractive to jump to the cycle is (1=2; 1=2) : This
implies that if a policy of making no new designs would be optimal anywhere,
it would certainly be optimal for X = 0:5 and Y = 0:5: In Figure 7 we plot
the di¤erence in the objective values for jumping to the cycle and staying:
V up V stay; where Y0 = 0:01. This gure shows that indeed for this Y0 staying
at X = Y = 0:5 is optimal for an interval that includes r-values between 0:2
and 0:4; while this does not occur for r = 0:1: The thin line proves that the
parameters are still in the relevant region, i.e., 12(r+2)   c > 0:
To determine the size of the region where making no design changes is op-
timal (so far we only know that it includes X = :5 and Y = :5) we have to
determine two other Skiba curves. The rst one includes those points where
jumping up followed by periodic design changes gives the same objective value
as making no changes. On the second one the fashion trend-setter is indi¤er-
ent between a policy of jumping down followed by periodic design changes, and
making no changes in the design. A numerical example in which these curves
occur is depicted in Figure 8.
In Figure 8 two other regions occur, where it is in fact optimal to have an
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Figure 7: Di¤erence in objective values for jumping to the cycle and staying,
when X = Y = 0:5 and Y0 = 0:1:


















Figure 8: Eight Skiba curves for the case that Y0 = 0:01; r = 0:2, and c = 0:189.
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the idea is that when the rst jump is upward (downward) it is only optimal to
make this design change after the imitator has moved in the downward (upward)
direction for a su¢ ciently long time. Only then does jumping create a large
enough di¤erence between the two designs for the trend-setter to make enough
prots to o¤set the cost of making the jump. Within the region wait-up
(wait-down) the upward (downward) movement takes place at the moment
that Y reaches the lower (upper) boundary of this region. In Appendix B we
provide some details on the computation of these Skiba curves.
8 Conclusions
Fashions change and even cycle. A variety of models have been advanced to
explain why. Most have focused on consumerstastes and behavior. Pesendor-
fer (1995) introduced perhaps the best-known model that explicitly considers
optimal dynamic strategies for suppliers of fashion goods. It focuses on the
monopoly case. However, it is not always easy to protect intellectual property
claims concerning fashion (as opposed to technical) innovations. Indeed, two
basic elements of the fashion industry are constant innovation by high-end de-
signer labels and low-cost "knock-o¤" brands striving to o¤er products that look
like those of the trend-setters.
Here we introduce a model whose solution describes how a high-end trend-
setter ought to respond to competition from one or more low-cost imitators
when the product space is bounded and consumers value one design over another
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only to the extent that it is distinguishable from the low-cost products. That is,
consumers have no intrinsic preference for one design over another, and it is not
possible for innovators to improve a product along some unbounded directional
dimension, always leading followers in that particular direction (e.g., constantly
by making faster and faster microchips).
The optimal strategy depends on the parameter values and, in many cases,
there is state-dependency. However, when the costs of innovation are low
enough, the trend-setter should innovate indenitely even though the product
space is bounded. I.e., it is optimal to create fashion cycles. Because there is no
notion of one side of product space being intrinsically better or worse than the
other, the optimal initial direction of innovation depends on the innovator and
imitators initial positions in product space. In particular, a two-dimensional
Skiba curve separates regions in state space within which it is optimal for the
innovator to begin by moving "left" or "right" in product space.
Not surprisingly, when the costs of innovation are high enough, the optimal
strategy involves no innovation. The trend-setter simply milks the prots avail-
able because of its initial product di¤erentiation, but is eventually overtaken by
imitators who by virtue of their lower cost structure take over the entire market.
Sometimes it is optimal for the trend-setter to extend this transient leadership
with a single innovation.
For intermediate costs there are initial positions such that the innovator is
indi¤erent between embarking on a long-term strategy of innovating indenitely
and one of these alternate strategies. Again, the collection of these indi¤erence
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points constitute Skiba curves. Indeed, there are places in state space where
several di¤erent Skiba curves meet. Furthermore, in most instances it is possi-
ble to write explicit analytical expressions characterizing these two-dimensional
Skiba curves and to explore how they depend on various model parameters.
Given our one-D abstraction of product space, some aspects of the optimal
solution are articial, such as the idea that fashion bounces forever between the
same two points. In reality, although may be simple cycling in one dimensional
projections of the higher dimensional product space (e.g., a color can be in,
then out of fashion, then back in again), the true product space is of much
higher-dimension. Translating the insights of our stylized model back into that
richer, more realistic image of the variety possible in fashion goods, we would
obtain the following prediction. We would expect the fashion leader to make
bold moves (equivalent to jumping from one boundary to another) in directions
that maximally di¤erentiate it from the followers, while still remaining within
the realm of what is "feasible" in customersminds. That is in fact not a bad
characterization of what is done at fashion shows.
9 Appendix A: Derivation of the Skiba Curve of
Section 3
From (9) and (10) it is obtained that equating the objective values of jumping
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which is the Skiba curve given by expression (11). QED
10 Appendix B: Technical Details of Section 5
We now discuss some technical details that relate to Figure 8. Ignoring for the
moment the regions wait-upand wait-down, we arrive at Figure 9.
Note that at point A the curve V stay = V up crosses the 45 line X = Y:
This means that to the left of point A, the curve V stay = V up is not relevant
anymore. Consider e.g. point B. Here V stay = V up but both policies stay
36

















Figure 9: Figure 8 without regions wait-upand wait-down.
foreverand jump up and follow cycleare not optimal anymore. The reason
is that from B onwards, staying at the current value ofX one immediately enters
the region where jumping up is better than staying. This implies that a
jump taking place at any point in time after leaving B is better than staying
forever or jumping immediately. This means that to the left of A and around
the naive triple pointT another policy has to be considered, namely wait
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Since the term in brackets (depending on ~Y ) does not depend on Y start,
the maximization of V wait up w.r.t. ~Y does not depend on Y start. Clearly
this value ~Y will be below the A-B-T line in Figure 9. At point T, i.e., for
Y = 0:27431 and X = 0:242 17 in Figure 9 we numerically obtain ~Y = 0:2475
which means that ~Y is closer to the 45 line than to T.
It should be noted that the di¤erence V wait up V up > 0 can be interpreted
as the option value of waiting.
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